मेरा मन अनत कहा सुख पावे
कमल नयन का छोड महातम और देव को ध्यावे
परम गंगा को छोड पियासो दुरमति कूप खानावे
जहि मधुकर अम्बुज रस चाख्यो क्यो करील फल भावे
सूरदास-प्रभु कामधेनु तजि छेरी कौन दुहावे.
AN ENDEAVOUR TO END PSEUDO-SECULARISM
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ALOK SINGH
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10:49 AM
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COMMUNIST HISTORIANS & AUTHORS HAVE PORTRAYED OUR GREAT MARTYRS & TRUE SONS OF OUR MOTHERLAND VERY INDECENTLY & IN A NASTY WAY.ACCORDING TO THESE SO CALLED INTELLECTUAL DEVILS
SHUBASH CHANDRA BOSE WAS - TOJO'S DOG
BHAGAT SINGH WAS - PROGENY OF PIGS
SWAMI VIVEKANAND - HINDU IMPERIALIST
RAMKRISHN PARAMHANS - HOMOSEXUAL PERVERT
RAVINDRA NATH TAGORE- PIMP
SARDAR PATEL - DIRTY WAR MONGER
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ALOK SINGH
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10:20 AM
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स्वामी विवेकानंद एक ऐसे व्यक्तित्व के धनी व्यक्ति थे जिन्होने मात्र 39 वर्ष के जीवन काल मे देश के युवाओं तथा जन मानस में एक ऐसी मन्त्र दीक्षा दी, कि पूरा देश आज उनका अनुकरण कर रहा है। स्वामी विवेकानन्द कोई दिव्यात्मा नही थे, किन्तु उन्होने अपने गुणों के बल पर अपने आपको दिव्यात्मा की श्रेणी मे ला कर खड़ा कर दिया है।
स्वामी विवेकानन्द के बारे मे बहुत कुछ लिखना चाह रहा था किन्तु लिखते लिखते एक ऐसा चिठ्ठा मिल गया जिसके आगे मै कुछ न लिख सका अगर लिखता तो वह स्वमी विवेकानन्द के बारे मे बहुत कम होता। मै आपको इस लेख के लिंक दे देता हूँ। आप वहॉ जाकर ही पढ़े और लेखक को धन्यवाद ज्ञापित करे।
विवेक
अन्य लिंक
विकिपीडिया
विवेक और आनंद के प्रतीक : स्वामी विवेकानंद
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ALOK SINGH
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10:42 PM
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TERROR UNBOUND -14 YEARS OLD HINDU CHILD BURNT ALIVE
The constant aggression of Islamic terror continues to haunt the Hindus of West Bengal. The severe atrociites on Hindus by Islamic radicals in Muslim populated villages of West Bengal are forcing thousands of Hindus to leave their ancestral home and villages and migrate away silently. The Muslim dominated villages of the districts of 24 Parganas(S) and 24 Parganas (N), Nadia, Malda, North Dinajpur and Murshidabad, have become hot breeding grounds of terrorists and every day there are more and more incidents of unbound terror and atrocities on the Hindus while the Left – Front Government and the West Bengal Police remain a silent spectator with its severe pro-Islamic, anti-Hindu stand. SAMARAT MONDAL is only 14. He was a student of class 8 and lived with his family in the village of Kharimachan of Basanti P.S. in 24 Parganas(S) dist. of West Bengal. On the evening of 4 th May 2007, a gang of 20 Muslims led by Gausher Ali Gayen, Samsher Ali Gayen caught Samrat at gun point in the middle of the field when he was returning from school and forced him into a ditch. Few of them held him down forcefully while the others poured Kerosene oil on the innocent boy and finally set him on fire. All the other Muslims about 20 of them, and some young Muslim boys who were playing in the nearby field, watched and laughed as Samrat was burning heavily and not a single person came to his help. With, fire catching up on his entire body, Samrat ran towards a shallow pond to save his life. He jumped in that pond and tossing himself repeatedly in the mud he was finally able to stop the fire but by then he was already 50% burnt, the skin from his body and lower abdomen ripping away as he became unconscious in the tremendous pain. Watch the videohttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUz72IAD8J0
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ALOK SINGH
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3:34 PM
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Nuclear India: A Short History
Supporters of nuclear weapons argue that India’s decision to cross the nuclear threshold is in continuity with New Delhi’s policies in the past. They claim that if there is any policy change under the BJP-led coalition, it is only in response to the altered ground situation, especially in our neighborhood.This is misleading, false and dishonest. At the doctrinal level. May 1998 marks a violent break with India’s past postures. The decision to acquire nuclear weapons, and the plan to deploy them, is a betrayal of India’s commitment to nuclear disarmament and its promise never to use nuclear energy for military purposes.This does not mean that India’s nuclear, weapons policy has been constant and unchanging for 51 years since Independence. It has gone through four distinct phases, culminating in the disastrous decision to test, acquire and deploy these weapons of mass destruction
Phase I: THE NEHRU ERA, 1947 TO THE MID-1960S
This was a period of voluntary nuclear abstinence. Nehru was not only deeply committed to the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons, but also opposed to their manufacture and possession by any state, including India. He was opposed to nuclear weapons on moral, political and strategic grounds, calling their possession a “crime against humanity”. He integrated this opposition into India’s foreign policy, giving it an activist edge. he was the first world leader to call for an end to all nuclear testing following U.S. bomb,b tests in the Pacific in 1954. However, India’s civilian nuclear energy programme under the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) also had a dual-use capacity; major figures such as Homi Bhabha were not unaware of this. Bhabha himself was not as categorically opposed to a possible future Bomb as was Nehru.On July 24, 1957, Nehru said in the Lok Sabha:We have declared quite clearly tht we are not interested in making atom bombs, even if we have the capacity to do so and that in n event will we use nuclear energy for destructive purposes...I hope that will be the policy of all future governments.And just months before his death, when reports were pouring in of China’s nuclear preparations, Nehru rejected the suggestion that India should follow China and acquire nuclear weapons for “deterrence”
PHASE II: MID-1960S TO 1974
In this period New Delhi became increasingly disenchanted with the prospect for global disarmament. Quiet preparations were being made to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, while retaining a strong opposition to deterrence and weaponisation. India’s nuclear programme under Homi Bhabha underwent a significant shift at the ground level. Bhabha commissioned a plant to reprocess spent fuel from the CIRUS “research” reactor built with Canadian and U.S. assistance. In his speech in October 1964 following China’s first test, he said tht India too could conduct a test in 18 months. But such changes were not articulated at the policy level. In October 1965, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri told Parliament:Despite the continued threat of aggression from China which has developed nuclear weapons, the government has continued to adhere to decisions not go in for nuclear weapons but to work for their elimination instead.In April 1968, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi said in the Lok Sabha:[India’s nuclear] policy is framed after due consideration of the national interest, specifically with regard to national security... we do feel that the events of the last twenty years clearly show tht the possession of nuclear weapons have not given any military advantage in situations of bitter armed conflict.She argued that “The choices before us involves...engaging in an arms race with sophisticated nuclear war beads and an effective missile delivery system..Such a course, I do not think would strengthen natinal security... it may well endanger our internal security by imposing a very heavy economic burden...”Indian policy pronouncements in this post-Nehru period underwent a subtle shift from a categorical oppositon to a “no Bombs now” orientation. The new uncertainties were relflected in the Indian attitude to the NPT negotiations, an arena where India had initially played a significant role. The final draft diluted what India and other non-nuclear weapons-states wanted - a better balance between the obligations of the nuclear weapons-states signatories and the non nuclear weapons-states signatories. Despite this watering down, the other non-nuclear weapons-states went along with the treaty, but India did not sign.Why? First, there was China’s decision not to sign the BPT and India’s new reluctance to commit itself to complete or permanent future abstinence. Subsequent Indian opposition to the NPT is invariably and repeatedly stated in terms of India’s “principled” opposition to the discriminatory character of the NPT, or the very fact of its enshrining differential obligations for nuclear weapons-states and non-nuclear weapons-states.The ground level preparations, and accumulation of unsafeguarded plutonium form CIRUS, gave Indira Gandhi an opportunity to conduct Pokharan-I in May 1974-a test which the DAE scientist had long been demanding. the test, purportedly for “peaceful” civilian purposes, or a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) was carried out for primarily domestic political reasons. Yet India continued to strongly reject nuclear deterrence or grant any kind of legitimacy to nuclear weapons.On May 22,1974, four days after Pokharan-I, Indira Gandhi wrote to Bhutto to assure him:I am aware that in popular parlance a nuclear explosion evokes an awesome and horrifying picture. however, this is because our minds have been conditioned by the misuse of nuclear energy for the development of weapons and by the use of these weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We in India have condemned and will continue to condemn military uses of nuclear energy as a threat to humanity. Mrs. Gandhi emphasised that “it is strictly in this context tht our scientists have launched on this experiment... There are no political or foreign policy implications of this test.”
PHASE III: 1974 TO 1995-96
Further work on India’s nuclear weapons capability was suspended after adverse fallout. A conscious policy of nuclear ambiguity was adopted by New Delhi. This consisted in both affirming and denying tht India had/could have nuclear weapons/capability and seeking a special status as a Nuclear Threshold State. Meanwhile, in 1978, under Prime Minister Morarji Desai, the Indian government distanced itself from the 1974 PNE, and Desai emphasised the “peaceful” side of ambiguity while expressing misgivings about the safety of nuclear power.After the mid-1980s, hawkish pressure mounted on New Delhi to go overtly nuclear in response to Pakistan’s reported nuclear preparations. India rejected seven proposals by Pakistan for nuclear restraint and regional disarmament, saying it would only discuss nuclear disarmament in “global, multilateral” fora, and in a “non-discriminatory” frame work.India’s sole strategy of containing an alleged “Pakistani threat” was to entreat the U.S. to exert pressure on Pakistan, through the Pressler Amendment, for instance. Meanwhile, its own stockpiling of high-grade plutonium continued, with an estimated 300 to 450 kg accumulated by the mid-1990s enough for 60 to 90 fission bombs.However, in 1986, India joined the Five-Continent Six-Nation Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament and in 1988 put forward the Rajiv Gandhi Plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons in the UN. This involved a step-by-step process including restraint at an early stage by the threshold states, including India. This was not energetically pursued. As the negotiations for a CTBT, which India had pioneered, entered their final phase, New Delhi stalled, making signing the CTBT conditional upon “time-bound” disarmament by the P-5. It tried to hedge the treaty in with clauses that appeared radical, but were meant to delay negotiations and prepare the ground for non-accession to a test ban agreement.Domestically, New Delhi came under growing pressure to oppose the CTBT and then “logically” proceed to conduct test explosions: why reject the CTBT as a “trap” and “conspiracy” and then behave as if it were still in place; why bear the cost of opposition without reaping the “benefits” of nuclearisation?In 1995, before the CTBT “rolling text” acquired its penultimate form, the Narasimha Rao government launched preparations for a test at Pokharan. The Cabinet was divided, and US military satellites detected preparations. Publicity, as well as the fear of economic sanctions, deterred Indian from testing. But a big shift had occurred at the ground level.Yet, at the stated doctrinal level, there was no change. In 1995 Indian argued passionately before the International Court of Justice that “use of nuclear weapons in any armed conflict... even by way of reprisal or retaliation...is unlawful... Since the production and manufacture cannot under any circumstances be considered as permitted...The threat of use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance, whether as a means or method of warfare or otherwise, as illegal and unlawful under international law.”At the height of the CTBT debate, in March 1996, India’s foreign secretary Salman Haider made a special appearance before the Conference on Disarmament to say:We do not believe tht the acquisition of nuclear weapons is essential for national security, and we have followed a conscious decision in this regard. We are also convinced tht the existence of nuclear weapons diminishes international security. We, therefore, seek their complete elimination. These are fundamental precepts that have been an integral basis of India’s foreign and national security policy.However, slippages from India’s professed commitment to nuclear restraint and disarmament had by now become evident. “Ambiguity” degraded significantly. India blocked the CTBT’S passage at the CD, but the text was taken to the UN General Assembly and signed. Hawks within and outside the government raised the level of rhetoric in favour of India crossing the threshold. The BJP and right-wing commentators in the media seized on the anti-CTBT rhetoric, to which there was little organised resistance.
PHASE IV: 1996 TO MAY 1998.
Having yielded so much ground to hawkish positions and stoked jingoistic nationalism. New Delhi had now become a prisoner of its own devious manoeuvres. The nuclear and defence establishments got hyperactive in lobbying for explosions and a policy break to permit full weaponisation.The BJP articulated this point of view most vociferously at the political level. By 1997, its demands for overt nuclearisation became insistent. Its manifesto for the February 1998 general elections promised to “re-evaluate the country’s nuclear policy and exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons.”Till March 1998, the BJP was the sole the Indian party to advocate nuclearisation. But the situation changed with the BJP-led coalition’s “National Agenda for Governance” which repeated the precise formulation of the BJP manifesto. The BJP issued orders to the DAE, Defence Research & Development Organisation and the armed forces t prepare for and conduct tests - without consulting its coalition allies. But the RSS was privy to the decision.The first statement of the strategic rationale of the tests was offered by Prime Minister Vajpayee, not to the people of India, but to the President of the United States. His statement made no reference whatever to the “unequal global nuclear order”, “nuclear apartheid” and the failure of the P-5 to disarm. Instead, it offered “close cooperation” to Washington to promote “the cause of nuclear disarmament” ... thus wrongly conceding that the U.S. has such a commitment. It only spoke of the threat form China and Pakistan, heightened by Sino-Pakistani nuclear and missile collaboration.On May 27, the government made a feeble but devious attempt to raionalise its reversal of earlier nuclear policies through a paper entitled “Evolution of India’s Nuclear Policy” laid in the Lok Sabha. This strung together half-truths and distortions to claim continuity - much in the same way tht hawks seek to paint Mahatma Gandhi as a legitimiser of the Indian Bomb
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ALOK SINGH
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After the five nuclear weapon tests of May 11 and 13, the BJP-led government has declared India a nuclear weapons power. This decision in no way increases India’s security and is not in the interest of its people. By qualitatively escalating the arms race in the subcontinent, it makes a war with our neighbours likelier and the possibility of mutual annihilation through a nuclear exchange very real. The tests and the consequent rhetoric by senior government leaders introduce a new spiral of suspicions and tensions with our neighbours which will increase, not decrease, nuclear insecurities all around.These tests were a complete departure from a settled national consensus. There was a national consensus in favour of elimination of all nuclear weapons; there was a national consensus that in the absence of any tangible movement towards global disarmament, India must keep its nuclear option open. This consensus has now been breached in the pursuit of narrow political ends and in the name of a fake national consensus supporting nuclear weapons that is now belied in Parliament and on the streets. These decisions by the Government to move towards nuclear weapons are therefore reprehensible and deserve to be unequivocally condemned. The Indian Government’s dangerous move towards nuclear weaponsiation has now brought forth a similar Pakistani response which also needs to be condemned.
The tests and the dynamic that they have initiated will also adversely affect the prospect for global disarmament which had improved with increasing public opinion against nuclear weapons. India, which always called for nuclear disarmament and did not wish to be a party to a discriminatory global nuclear regime, is now seen to be only demanding to join the Nuclear Weapons Club. According to the current strategic thinking of the BJP, “nuclear apartheid” is acceptable as long as we are among the discriminators: the Select Six as opposed to the Select Five! We strongly condemn the hypocritical behaviour associated with the attainment of nuclear weapon status by the Indian government. We believe that nuclear weapons are not safe in the hands of any nation. We also deplore sanctions imposed by nuclear weapons-states which show no commitment to genuine nuclerar disarmament. But this does not exonerate the BJP in any way.
The BJP-led coalition has also reversed India’s long-standing policy of denying legitimacy to nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are uniquely evil and have no legitimate role to play as strategic armaments or as deterrents. They are weapons of mass destruction. The sheer scale of their impact, even if only a “few” such weapons are ever used, is simply unconscionable.
Hiroshima and Nagasaki are horrific examples of the destructive potential of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons cannot distinguish between combatants and civilians. They impose suffering of the most horrible kind on their victims, including on the yet-unborn through trans-generational effects. Civil and medical defence against them is impossible. They are uniquely evil in their capacity to exterminate all life on this planet.
The International Court of Justice has unequivocally condemned nuclear weapons. Calling them “the ultimate evil,” its President pronounced the decision of the Court on July 8, 1996, declaring the threat and use of nuclear weapons “generally contrary to rules of international law applicable in armed conflict.” In its historic decision, the Court unanimously called on all states to “bring to a conclusion” negotiations leading to “disarmament in all its aspects.”
Our Principles and Objectives
1. We are deeply and firmly committed to universal nuclear disarmament.
We reject the argument that we must live forever with such weapons or that the nuclear genie cannot be put back into the bottle. We, as ethical and rational human beings can make this choice: the responsibility is ours. There is a special obligation on the nuclear weapons-states and nuclear-capable states to rapidly move towards universal nuclear disarmament.
2. Nuclear weapons, possessed no matter by which country or government, do not increase, but reduce, national security.
The Club of nuclear weapons-states has always been a collection of hypocrites who claim that their possession of these weapons is the best insurance for global peace, while their acquisition by others would be a threat! India has now put in its application for joining this Club, albeit as a junior member.
The Cold War era has conclusively shown that national nuclear posturing aggravates existing rivalries and hostilities and creates new ones. It is dangerous to use external threats as diversionary tactics, as the present government seems to be doing through nuclear weaponisation.
A nuclear weapons regime is by its very nature secretive and elitist, and thus profoundly anti-democratic. It further promotes and deepens the ugly militarisation of everyday life and thinking that is already taking place in India. The ideology of nuclearism which is currently being touted as nuclear nationalism is inseparable from the promotion of an ideology of masculinist aggressiveness. Today, this can be identified as the hallmark of communal nationalism. This has nothing in common with India’s pluralist tradition.
National nuclear arming creates a false sense of pride and imposes continuing and rising economic, social and political costs. The social and economic costs of nuclearisation, both through missed opportunities and direct weapons manufacture and deployment, can be crippling. Nuclear weapons are incompatible with rational development goals. They represent a wasteful diversion from the true and fundamental security needs of ordinary people. In India the high costs of development of a nuclear arsenal, of its maintenance, storage, constant upgradation and expansion, will impair our ability to redress our basic ills such as sharp inequalities, casteism, communalism and sexism.
3. India must declare that it will never use nuclear weapons under any circumstances.
The government’s initial position that it will only use such weapons for “defence”, not for aggression, allows their first use. The vague claim for “defence purposes” can justify any act, and does not distinguish between nuclear and non-nuclear conflicts. The government’s subsequent contradictory offer of conditional no-first-use is inadequate. The use of nuclear weapons is wholly immoral and unacceptable and indefensible under all circumstances. India must also seek no use pledge from all nuclear weapon states.
4. India and Pakistan must put an end to all nuclear testing.
There is no justification for any further testing by either India or Pakistan. The Pakistani retaliatory tests must not be used to rationalise more Indian tests, let alone open deployment of nuclear weapons.
5. No production and no deployment of nuclear weapons, either by India or Pakistan. Above all, no arming of planes, missiles and other delivery vehicles with nuclear weapons, and no deployment of such delivery vehicles.
Unlike in 1974, the 1998 tests are connected to a programme of weaponisation of bombs of different sizes and yields. They suggest that India is even thinking of producing battlefield nuclear weapons like nuclear-tipped artillery shells, etc. This raises the chances of their being used, leading to dangerous nuclearisation of conventional military exchanges, possibly triggering a full-scale nuclear exchange.
There must be complete transparency in the nuclear-related regime. In order to decide about its own security, the public must always know fully what is done by the powerful who talk in the name of the people but are determined to keep information and power to themselves alone.
If India and Pakistan do not deploy nuclear weapons, we may still escape a nuclear arms race. Maintaining the firebreak between tests and open deployment or operationalisation of India’s nuclear capability has become crucial. If this firebreak is established—and holds—we can still prevent a futile descent into headlong nuclear hostility, tension and rivalry and therefore into a spiral of ever-growing insecurity.
India can still salvage some credibility as a serious campaigner for global nuclear disarmament if it refrains from open deployment.
6. It is imperative that India returns sincerely, seriously and energetically to the nuclear disarmament agenda. Our real security lies in a world free of nuclear weapons.
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ALOK SINGH
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3:23 PM
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India & Disarmament
Since Independence, India has consistently pursued the objective of global disarmament based on the principles of universality, non-discrimination and effective compliance. Given the horrific destructive capacity of nuclear weapons, India has always believed that a world free of nuclear weapons would enhance both global security and India's own national security. Thus India has always advocated that the highest priority be given to nuclear disarmament as a first step towards general and complete disarmament.
As early as 1948, India called for limiting the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only, and the elimination of atomic weapons from national armaments. India was the first country to call to an end to all nuclear testing in 1954. This was followed up in subsequent decades by many other initiatives, for example, on the Partial Test Ban Treaty, and the call for international negotiations on nuclear non-proliferation. In 1978, India proposed negotiations for an international convention that would prohibit the use of threat of use of nuclear weapons. This was followed by another initiative in 1982 calling for a "nuclear freeze" - i.e. prohibition on the production of fissile material for weapons, on production of nuclear weapons, and related delivery systems. At the special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament, India put forward a number of serious proposals including the 1988 Comprehensive Plan for total elimination of weapons of mass destruction in a phased manner. It was a matter of regret that the proposals made by India along with several other countries did not receive a positive responsive and instead, a limited and distorted non-proliferation agenda, meant above all to perpetuate nuclear weapons was shaped.
"We are approaching the close of the twentieth century. It has been the most bloodstained century in history. Fifty eight million perished in two World Wars. Forty million more have died in other conflicts. In the last nine decades, the ravenous machines of war have devoured nearly one hundred million people. The appetite of these monstrous machines grows on what they feed. Nuclear war will not mean the death of a hundred million people. Or even a thousand million. It will mean the extinction of four thousand million: the end of life as we know it on our planet Earth. We come to the United Nations to seek your support. We seek your support to put a stop this madness."
Rajiv Gandhi (while addressesing the third SpecialSession on Disarmament , UN General Assembly in June 1988)
India was compelled by considerations of national security to establish and adopt a policy of keeping its nuclear option open while it continued to work for global nuclear disarmament. India's nuclear capability was demonstrated in 1974. India exercised an unparalleled restraint in not weaponising its nuclear capability. It is relevant to recall, that during this period, when we voluntarily and totally desisted from testing, over 35,000 nuclear weapons were developed through a series of tests by states possessing nuclear weapons. This was happened even as Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty committed the Nuclear Weapons States, party to the NPT, to take steps in good faith for nuclear disarmament. India was obliged to stand apart on the CTBT in 1996 after having been actively engaged in the negotiations for two and a half years precisely because the issues of non-proliferation, global disarmament and India's concerns about her security and strategic autonomy were ignored.
India's continued commitment to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is clear from the voluntary measures announced by India after undertaking a limited series of underground nuclear tests last year. India remains committed to converting its voluntary moratorium into a de jure obligation in accordance with our long held positions on disarmament, and in response to the desire of the international community that the CTBT should come into effect in September 1999. India has declared that it will maintain a minimum credible nuclear deterrent and will not engage in an arms race. India has declared a no-first-use doctrine. We are willing to strengthen this commitment by undertaking bilateral agreements as well as engaging in discussions for a global no-first-use agreement. India believes that a global no-first-use agreement would be the first step towards the delegitimization of nuclear weapons. India remains the only state possessing nuclear weapons to unambiguously call for a Nuclear Weapons Convention to ban and eliminate nuclear weapons just as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) have banned the other two categories of weapons of mass destruction.
Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
In 1996, India, along with the members of the Group of 21 countries, put forward a proposal, submitted to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), of a Programme of Action calling for a phased elimination of nuclear weapons (1996-2020). India has also unambiguously indicated its commitment to the establishment of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to negotiate global nuclear disarmament. India is also the only state with nuclear weapons, which responded positively to certain aspects of the 8-Nation initiative on disarmament, entitled "Towards a Nuclear-Weapon Free World", put forward in June 1998 by Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden. At the NAM Summit in Durban, at India's initiative, NAM agreed that an international conference be held, preferably in 1999, with the objective of arriving at an agreement, before the end of this millennium, on a phased programme for the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. The call for the elimination of nuclear weapons has been reiterated once again by Prime Minister in his address to the UN General Assembly. India remains committed to cooperation with like minded states to attain this goal. India also introduced a resolution in the 53rd General Assembly calling for reducing nuclear danger by de-alerting nuclear weapons.
India is fully committed to the goal of curbing nuclear proliferation in all its aspects. It was at India's initiative that the item "non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" was included in the agenda of the UN in 1964. In 1965, India along with other like-minded countries submitted a joint memorandum towards achieving a solution to the problem or proliferation; it included the conclusion of an international nuclear non-proliferation treaty. However, the NPT as it emerged from these negotiations, was flawed and discriminatory, seeking to create a permanent division between the nuclear 'haves' and 'have-nots'. India believes that the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT in May 1995 has only served to legitimize nuclear arsenals of the NPT states possessing nuclear weapons into perpetuity, thus posing a major obstacle to the goal of global nuclear disarmament. The NPT Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) meetings held in 1997 and 1998 have also clearly demonstrated this reluctance on the part of the five NPT states possessing nuclear weapons to take steps towards a speedy process of global nuclear disarmament.
India has developed wide-ranging expertise in nuclear technology but has ensured through a stringent and effective system of export controls that there is no proliferation of these technologies for weapons purposes. India's record in this matter is, in fact, better than some of the NPT signatories. At the same time, we are against ad hoc regimes or cartels which attempt to restrict high technology in an arbitrary, unequal and patently discriminatory manner. They need to be universalised, made transparent and equitable.
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
India's commitment to a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing dates back to 1954 when Jawaharlal Nehru called for a "standstill agreement" whereby testing of all nuclear weapons was to be immediately suspended, pending an agreement on their complete prohibition. It was again at India's initiative that the item "Suspension of Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear Tests" was included in the agenda of the UN in 1959.
During the course of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) Geneva on the CTBT, India put forward a number of proposals consistent with the mandate adopted by the CD in 1994. These proposals were aimed at ensuring that the CTBT would be truly comprehensive and would be part of the step-by-step process of eliminating all nuclear weapons. However, these proposals were regrettably ignored and instead, Article XIV on Entry. Into Force requiring India to join the treaty before it became operational was adopted in violation of basic treaty law. India was thus forced to declare its opposition to the CTBT as it emerged.
After concluding a series of tests on May13, 1998, India immediately announced a voluntary moratorium on further underground nuclear test explosions. In announcing this moratorium, India accepted the core obligation of a test ban and also addressed the general wish of the international community. India also announced its willingness to move towards a de jure formalization of the voluntary undertaking. India is now engaged in discussions with key interlocutors on a range of issues, including the CTBT. India is prepared to bring these discussions to a successful conclusion, so that the entry into force of the CTBT is not delayed beyond September 1999. For the successful conclusion of talks, creation of a positive environment by India's interlocutors is a necessary ingredient. India expects that other countries, as indicated in Article XIV of the CTBT, will adhere to this Treaty without conditions.
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)
India supporters the ban on production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes. This demand has been articulated by India in the UN through concrete proposals like the Action Plan which it presented in 1988. India also co-sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution (48/75 L) in 1993, which called for an early commencement of negotiations for the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. India has joined the consensus in the Conference on Disarmament on establishing an ad hoc committee to negotiate an FMCT. India believes that this is an integral part of the nuclear disarmament process. It would also go a long way in arresting problems of illegal transfers of nuclear material. India supports efforts for negotiations on a universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty that would prohibit the future production of fissile material for weapons purposes but would permit such production for civilian uses.
Negative Security Assurances (NSAs) and Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs)
India has always maintained that NSAs provide illusory benefits, and that the real security assurance is complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and also that in the interim, if NSAs are to be given, they should be provided through an international, comprehensive, legally-binding and irreversible agreement. Similarly, consideration of security assurances in the narrow strait-jacket of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) cannot do justice to the wide variety of concerns that emanate from the global nature of the threat posed by nuclear weapons. As a responsible state possessing nuclear weapons, India has stated that it does not intend to use nuclear weapons to commit aggression or for mounting threats against any country. India respects the sovereign choice exercised by states not possessing nuclear weapons in establishing NWFZs on the basis of agreements freely arrived at among the states of the region concerned. At the fifth session of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Manila, India stated that it fully respects the status of the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in South East Asia and is ready to convert this commitment into a legal obligation.
India will remain responsive to the expressed need for commitments to other nuclear weapon free zones as well.
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
India is an original signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention, having signed it on 14 January 1993, and was among the first 65 countries to have ratified the Treaty. The universal and non-discriminatory character of the CWC are primarily responsible for the large number of signatories and the equally large numbers of ratifications. The implementation of the CWC involves a combination of voluntary declarations and mandatory verification arrangements aimed at ensuring compliance in a transparent and universal manner. A National Authority (NA) has been set up to oversee implementation of the Convention in India. As the first Chairperson of the Executive Council of the Organization for Chemical Weapons(OPCW), India guided the deliberations of the organization during its crucial first year. Implementation of all obligations assumed by India to the Convention and related activities have proceeded satisfactorily. India believes that the provisions of the Convention require to be implemented in a non-discriminatory manner. National implementing legislations containing provisions which undermine the Convention hold out the prospect of leading to matching responses by other states parties thereby leading to an unnecessary dilution of the spirit and the confidence reposed in the CWC by a great majority of countries party to the CWC. Similarly, the existence of technology denial regimes such as the Australia Group remains an aberration when seen against the large number of ratifications the Convention has enjoyed so far.
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
India ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in 1974. India has participated in all four Review Conferences of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and in the meetings of the Group of Governmental Experts. India is currently participating in the negotiations of the Ad hoc Group of the States Parties of the BTWC with the aim to strengthen the convention by a protocol, including possible verification measures. India maintains that these measures should be non-discriminatory and avoid any negative impact on scientific research, international cooperation and industrial development.
Anti-Personnel Landmines (APLs)
India is fully committed to the eventual elimination of anti-personnel landmines and achievement of the objective of a nondiscriminatory and universal ban on APLs. A beginning can be made with a ban on export and transfer of APLs, that would enjoy an international consensus, and by addressing humanitarian concerns and legitimate defence requirements of states. India is sensitive to the humanitarian aspects of the landmine crisis and the need for a strong international response. Aware that APLs have been used indiscriminately in conflicts not of an international nature, India has called for a ban on their use in all internal conflicts. India follows a conscious policy of not exporting APLs. India has also been contributing to UN de-mining efforts since the Congo peacekeeping operations in 1963. An officer of the Indian Army is presently deployed with the UN Mine Action Centre in Bosnia. India is presently in the process of ratifying amended Protocol II of the 1980 Inhumane Weapons Convention (CCW), which deals with anti-personnel landmines. India stands ready to negotiate a ban on the export and transfer of landmines in the Conference on Disarmament.
Transparency in Conventional Weapons Transfers and Small Arms
India is committed to strengthening the norm of transparency in conventional armaments in general, and greater participation in the UN Register of Conventional Arms in particular. India has reported to the Register annually since 1994. The issue of proliferation of, and illicit trafficking in, small arms has moved up the agenda of the international community on disarmament issues. India is acutely aware of this problem and intends to participate actively in international search for effective solutions, including a proposed international conference to discuss the issue of illicit trafficking in small arms in all its aspects.
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